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Compiled by Anthony Harrison-Barbet


DUNS SCOTUS

(c. 1266 — 1308)

 

'SCOTISM'

Born at Maxton, Roxburghshire (Scotland), John Duns Scotus was ordained in the Franciscan Order in 1291 and then studied at Oxford and Paris (1293-96). After lecturing at Oxford he returned to Paris in 1302 only to be banished a year later for favouring the Pope against the King. But he was soon back and received his doctorate in theology in 1305. He later taught at Cologne, where he died. He was given the title 'Doctor Subtilis' (Subtle Doctor) because of his dialectical skill.

 

METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

[1] For Scotus metaphysics and theology are distinct and have their own particular concerns — the former with being (ens) and its attributes, the latter with God [see, for example, Free Questions, 3 and 7, and Opus oxon. I and II]. He thinks of being as an essentially indefinable concept of that in whose existence there is no contradiction; and this applies to being in all its modes — including God, individual created things, and concepts. Metaphysics, however, cannot attain to an understanding of the true nature of being as such, as reason is limited and deals with the natural order and sense experience. Theology on the other hand is not understood as a 'science'; it is grounded in revelation — which is the concern of faith, and the 'knowledge' it provides us with can only be 'practical' [ibid., Prologue 4, 31]. It follows that while we can apprehend God through this central notion of being, beyond this we can know nothing about Him [a].

For Scotus all features of the world that pass beyond the physical (and which are not included in Aristotle's categories) are transcendentals. He distinguishes between finite beings (creatures) and infinite being (God); being is common to both. He distinguishes further between 'convertible' attributes (passiones convertibiles) and 'disjunctive' attributes (passiones disiunctae) [see, for example, ibid. I, 3, qq.ii and iii, and 8, q.iii]. The first includes notions such as true, good, one, which are interchangeable with being in that there is no real distinction between them, only a formal one [see sec. 2]. The 'pure' perfections of God, such as omnipotence, wisdom, and free-will, in whose definitions there are no limitations when applied to him, are also convertible attributes. The second, however, covers such concepts as necessity and contingency, and potentiality and actuality, which are not interchangeable with being if they are considered separately. Thus some beings are necessary and some contingent. All beings must of course be one or the other. Scotus says we can move from finite disjunctive attributes to infinite being, but not the other way round; a necessary existence does not entail a contingent one [b]. The deduction from potentiality to actuality or from contingency to actuality, according to Scotus, presupposes that 'being' is a univocal concept (he rejects the analogical account). By this he means that the concept, although applicable to different types of being, always has the same sense — referring to a universal nature. Thus it would be contradictory to say that God is being but that His creatures are not. God is of course being in a different way, but He and His creatures must have something sufficiently in common to allow a valid deduction from the existence of an attribute possessed by finite being to its predication of the infinite being — God in a perfect sense. Univocity is thus clearly essential to underpin Scotus's metaphysics [ibid.]. The univocal concept of being as such, abstracted from individual beings (it is the ultimate abstraction), is a logical concept. Considered as signifying other signs and not things (called intentio secunda in medieval logic), it has only a formal mental existence — as ens rationis). And although grounded in reality, having objective reference (when it is considered as intentio prima, as signifying things), there is no actual extramentally existent thing which, while corresponding to the universal concept, is separate from it [see, for example, ibid. II, 3, q.i] [c]. Scotus therefore (arguably) tends to the view that our 'subjective' mental and linguistic structures, while referring to the 'objective' realm, condition the way we experience the being of nature (ens naturae) [d]. Perhaps we can say then that beings are 'subjectively objective'. Underlying this position is the important idea of intentionality ('intentional inexistence'): all things are to be understood as the referred objects of mental acts of understanding [e].

[2] Another important idea in his metaphysics is that of an 'objective formal distinction' which is more objective than a virtual or mental distinction but is yet in some sense less than the real distinction [a]. He calls this distinctio formalis a parte rei ('formal distinction on the side of/ in respect of the thing') [ibid. I, 35 and 36; also IV, 13]. Thus, while he regards essence and existence as distinguishable, they are nevertheless inseparable, in that 'existence' applies strictly to essences of individual things, which have been actualized from the Ideas in God (and which exist qua known) [b]. In the same way he distinguishes between the physical nature of an object and its 'thisness'. (haecceitas) [II, 3]. What he means by these terms can be explained as follows. [See ibid. II, 3; Metaphysics V, 1 and 2.] An individual or 'composite' thing is made up of matter and its determining form or essence (its haecceitas) [c], as well as other forms — he thus accepted the plurality of forms, matter too having its own form of corporeity [d] — albeit imperfect by comparison with the soul, as well as the capacity of matter to receive other forms when substantial change occurs [see, for example, Comms IV, 11, iii]. And while he accepted the doctrine of hylomorphism, it is doubtful that he should be understood as intending to extend this beyond corporeal beings [Opus oxon. II, 12, q.i] [e]. Matter, however, is not a mere potentiality; if God so willed, it could exist on its own, separate from forms [ibid. II, 12, qq.i and ii] [f]. Indeed matter must exist to receive forms, and it must underlie substantial change. Scotus says that although not a form it is 'in act'. But he argues that matter is not the principle of individuation. If it were, then in a change of substance that which is produced and that from which it originates would be identical, despite a difference in form [ibid. II, 3, qq.v and vi]. What makes, say, Socrates that individual thing is his 'thisness', whereas his 'humanity' is attributed to his nature. Yet his haecceitas and his nature are not really separable, though they are distinguishable in so far as we can abstract the nature as a universal. But Scotus denies that the nature of, for example, 'humanity', common to Socrates and other human beings, is numerically identical in them all. Universals actually exist in the intellect, but are common only in the sense that they refer to 'natures' which are, however, unique to each individual. The distinction between an individual's nature and its 'thisness' is an 'objective formal' one [g]. He also rejected the theory of 'seminal reasons' [h] on the grounds that change can be accounted for by the causal activity of created efficient agents themselves [Reports II, 18, 1].

[3] As for his treatment of God, while He is strictly the proper object of theology, Scotus allows that His existence can be proved [see especially Op. ox., II, 2]; and he offers a number of arguments. He accepts the ontological argument, although he first 'colours' it to show there is no contradiction in the idea that God is the most perfect being and is thus possible [see, for example, Comms Prologue 4; Reports, Prologue]. In general he appeals to a posteriori proofs from God's effects in the world. But although the 'natural philosopher' can argue for a first mover to account for the fact of motion, for proof of the existence of God as first and efficient cause the arguments must be metaphysical. His main argument is based on the facts of contingency, finitude, and relative perfection in the world. While we can admit an infinite regress of successive contingent causes (he calls this an 'accidental' chain), for example of parent to child, the total chain itself must be assimilated to a set of 'essential' causes which includes all relevant causal factors and rests ultimately in the most 'eminent' or perfect being, the first efficient (and thereby exemplary), intelligent cause. This first cause must be necessary (it cannot not exist) [a] and renders accidental chains necessary and therefore transcendent; for if it were not, it would itself belong to the chain and thereby be contingent.

There can be only one ultimate or first cause. If there were two beings possessing a common nature of necessary being, their separate individualities would not be necessary being. A first cause must also be essentially simple, lacking matter, form and accidental qualities, and must be absolutely infinite Being or divine essence in which are grounded all perfections (goodness, truth, justice, and so on) to an infinite degree. And God must be infinite if He is to know and produce an infinity of objects. Furthermore, only an infinite being can satisfy our finite will's desire for an infinite object. As there is no incompatibility between being and infinity, the most superior being must be infinite. It follows from Scotus's arguments that all God's attributes are really identical — with themselves and the divine essence, though they are formally distinct. Nevertheless, he maintains that while God's infinity, necessity, uniqueness, freedom, and creative power are demonstrable philosophically, other attributes (such as omnipotence, justice, goodness, providence) are a matter of revelation and faith and cannot be confirmed by reason [b].

Scotus distinguishes between the divine essence, intellect, and will. His essence is logically, but not temporarily prior to his intellect, that is, the divine Idea, and is thus not identical with it. It contains implicitly the intelligible 'natures' as actual or possible 'imitations' of the essence — the exemplars of the things He wills to create. The exemplars thus depend on His knowledge of His essence [c]; and He knows His created things through their possibility in his essence and not through the exemplary Ideas themselves. And they are infinite in number but God chooses to create only some of the possible corresponding sensible objects. [See ibid. I, 35-36.] His intellect is thus subordinate to his will [IV, 49,q.ii]. His creativity is necessary in that His love for himself is part of His essential nature and has to be manifested. At the same time His willing, if it is to be perfect, must be free [d]. God thus 'assents' to the necessity of His love. But while Scotus accepts that God, as first efficient cause, can create immediately out of nothing (otherwise there would be no mediate creation, that is, the existing world), he does not believe creation in time can be proved [e]. Further, in so far as God is creator by will and not by essence (in which case creation would be necessary), His relation to creatures is 'mental' and not 'real'. The relation of creatures to God, however, is real, though it is only through His will that contingent creatures can 'meet' Him as necessary being [Ibid. I, 3 and 17; 35 and 36; Repub. I, 45]. As for the problem of evil, God providentially allows for its existence in the world to a limited degree in so far as He wishes men to learn from error — much of the evil resulting from their misuse of freedom [f].

 

PSYCHOLOGY

[4] [Op. ox., IV, 43, q.ii] The rational soul is the substantial form of man, says Scotus; it is what makes us alive and human. It is not itself a substance (a composite of body and soul) [a]. He argues as follows. Each of our senses has its own proper object — colour, sound, and so on. The intellect, however, 'cognises' being. It does not depend on a sense organ and can pass beyond the senses to apprehend, for example, relations. We also know ourselves to be free beings. Now, neither intellectual understanding nor voluntary acts can be brought about by a material form. Our intellect and will therefore transcend the organic and must be functions of spiritual form. This is the rational soul. Its 'activity' and 'passivity' are not regarded by Scotus as distinct powers [On the Soul 13 — though this may not be a wholly genuine work of Scotus's (see Wolter)]. As for the 'faculties' — intellectual, sensitive, and vegetative — these are distinct only in the 'objective formal' sense. The soul thus brings about the perfection of the whole man [b]. At death, although the composite being undergoes corruption, both the soul in its higher form and the body survive (the latter by virtue of its imperfect corporeal form), albeit temporarily [see Op. ox., IV, 43, q.ii passim.]. However, for Scotus neither the immortality of the soul nor the resurrection of the body can be demonstrated with certainty; they are only probable, and are to be accepted on faith [c]. A priori arguments, based on the nature of the rational soul in its intellectual aspect — considered as a form transcending the composite being, do not show, moreover, that such a form is either necessarily independent of the composite or self-subsistent. As for a posteriori moral arguments, for example, ones grounded in man's desire for beatitude or in his need for sanctions after death, these are, for Scotus, even less satisfactory. Likewise, a natural desire to avoid death (found also in non-human animals) does not prove immortality. We would first have to show that immortality is possible before arguing to it from the recognition of any conscious desire. Finally, we cannot appeal to the hope of rewards in the next life for good behaviour in this one, because we do not know that God will reward us.

As in the case of God, Scotus stresses the primacy of the human will over intellect [see Op. ox. IV, 49, qq.ii and iii; I, 8]. The intellect must therefore necessarily assent to any truths it may apprehend. Likewise, the will, in so far as it is a natural inclination to self-perfection, necessarily desires happiness. But the intrinsic nature of the will lies in its freedom [ibid. I, 17, q.iii] [d]: it can choose to act or not to act to realize some end. And although knowledge is needed to apprehend such an end, the will can, through its freedom, direct the intellect to attend to a particular object.

 

KNOWLEDGE

[5] It is in the very nature of the soul to know. So what does Scotus understand by 'knowledge', and how does the soul attain it? [See especially ibid. I, 2, q.vii; 3, qq.iv, ix; 9, q.ii.]. Knowledge in the primary sense consists in the intellect's apprehension of being as being. But Scotus says that in this life being can be known only as it is manifested in material things. The starting-point for this 'secondary' knowledge is sense experience; and there are no innate ideas [Metaphys. 1, ii] [a]. Scotus also rejects any involvement of 'illumination' — divine or intellectual [Op. Ox. I, 3, iv] [b]. He distinguishes between intuitive and abstractive secondary knowledge [for example, ibid. I, 3, iii; 2, vii] [c]. The former is 'perfect' when knowledge is immediate — of a present object — but 'imperfect' when of an existent or real object considered in the memory or as existing in the future. Abstractive knowledge, on the other hand, is of the essence of a thing without regard to whether it actually exists or not. Knowledge is firstly of individuals, singular things (their 'thisness'), of essences or forms, and of first principles implicit in complexes (for example that the whole is greater than the part) — the intellect being moved by sensations or imagination (comprising phantasms) [cf. On the Soul, 22, 3]. Knowledge is effected when, through the cooperation of its active and passive functions, the intellect interacts with the 'intelligible likenesses' of objects (sensory or intelligible species), which convey to it 'their common natures'. The intellect can also transcend the sense to achieve knowledge of universals and relations [d]. However, our intuition of singular things is confused. Scotus attributes this to a human limitation resulting from original sin, or it may reflect the need for a harmonization of our powers [Op. ox. II, 3, vi and ix; Free Questions 13, viii-x]. This limitation also accounts for our inability to have any immediate intuition of the soul. (As for God, there can be no knowledge of the divine essence in this life or after it [e]. ) Scotus says there is a role for inductive procedures. Thus we can come to a knowledge of natural causes of effects by generalizing from our experience of number of instances. But for the most part he uses demonstrative (deductive) proofs and tries to show that an effect follows logically or 'self-evidently' from its cause; such knowledge is more certain [f].

 

ETHICS

[6] [See especially Opus oxon., II, 5, 7, 18, 40 and 41; III, 19, 37; IV, 1, 5, 14 and 15.] 'Goodness' for Scotus is to be understood in several ways. A thing is transcendentally good in so far as it is a being, that is a positive entity, which can be desired. This is a property of all beings. A thing is naturally (or secondarily) good when it possesses harmoniously all those qualities which are 'proper' to that thing or 'becoming' to it, just as something is made beautiful by virtue of its colour, shape, and so on. Such goodness is an 'accident' of being [a]. Likewise an action or activity is naturally good when it is in harmony with its efficient cause, its end, and its form. To be morally good, however, an action must be freely willed, and the 'circumstances' of the act must all be present. These include objectivity (through the conformity of the willed action to what is morally right [Op. ox., II, 40, qq.ii, iii] — this is primary moral goodness, and is intuitable by the reason without divine illumination); and also the requirement that it be done for the right end and with the right intention [b]. If the act is performed by the will having regard to all these circumstances, especially the intention, then it is said to possess secondary moral goodness [II, 7, q.i]. The absence or even deficiency of any one of these circumstances will affect the goodness of the action. Thus a good end sought by a bad means will make the action evil; while doing something positive (for example, giving alms) as a result of mere inclination or impulse rather than with an explicitly good intention (that is, not referred to the infinite good actually or virtually) will render the act morally 'indifferent', that is, neither good nor bad [ibid.]. Loving God is an exception; it can never be morally evil, requiring only conformity to right reason. What, then, makes reason as the objective standard 'right'? Scotus seems to hold the view that an objectively moral natural law is intrinsic to God's creation and cannot be altered. However, he distinguishes between the objective content of the moral law and the obligation on us as finite beings to perform right actions [Op. ox. IV, 14]. This obligation originates from God; and sin is disobedience to God's will. God himself can of course will only what is objectively good — which He perceives by His intellect. But Scotus also says that God can give us dispensation from some secondary laws which are in accordance with primary self-evident moral principles (but not from the primary laws themselves or from those deducible from them [see, for example, Op. ox., III, 37] [c].

 

CRITICAL SUMMARY

Scotus's philosophy is sui generis. Critical of both Augustinianism (with respect to the role of divine illumination) and Thomas's use of Aristotelian terminology to describe God, Scotus marks the beginning of a radical change in medieval thought. In effect he set out to reinterpret the relationship of faith to reason: reason is now limited to a metaphysics of Being, while faith is concerned with divine revelation. Thus we find a greater place being accorded to reason and in consequence a delimiting of the sphere of natural theology. It is only through Being — as a univocal abstraction common to all existents, finite and infinite — that a link with God is retained and His existence provable. Scotus also stresses God's complete freedom (His intellect being subordinated to His will, as is the case also with human creatures) and His necessary existence (created individuals being contingent). Scotus's originality is shown particularly in his concept of 'thisness' (the immediate manifestation of essence or form) as the individuating principle; and in his use of the Franciscan doctrine of 'objective formal distinction' — a distinction which delineates neither the subjective (mental) nor the objective (real), and which is applied to essences in things and the human soul. His account of individuation and his emphasis on immediate knowledge of the individual thing — its 'thisness' — by the intellect working with the senses are of particular interest for the role they played in informing the concept of 'inscape' introduced by the 19th century Jesuit poet Gerard Manley Hopkins to refer to the essential individuality and oneness of natural things.

From the standpoint of earlier philosophers in either of the two main traditions Scotus's weakening of the link between reason and faith was a dangerous move. Not only (it was argued) does God become virtually unknowable, and the continuity between God and his creation broken, but reason is now set free to undermine faith and authority — although this was not the intention of Scotus himself. On the other hand, from the point of view of thinkers who had no religious axe to grind, the confining of philosophy to the sensible natural order was to be regarded as a positive and liberating feature of Scotist thought.

 

READING

Scotus: [of many writings] Ordinatio or Opus Oxoniense (Oxford, c. 1300) and Reportata (Paris, 1302/3) — Lectures on the Sentences of Peter Lombard; Quaestiones Subtilissimae in Metaphysicam Aristotelis (Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics) (c. 1300); Quaestiones Quodibetales (1305/7) (Free Questions); Quaestiones in libros Aristotelis De Anima (Questions concerning Aristotle's 'On the Soul'). An excellent edition of selections is that of A. Wolter, O.F.M., Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings. [According to Wolter, p. xx, the authenticity of the Questions on Aristotle's de Anima is questionable.] See also McKeon, op. cit., vol. II, ch. 5

Studies

E. Bettoni, Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of his Philosophy.

S. Dumont, 'John Duns Scotus', in J. J. E. Garcia (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages.

A. Wolter, The Philosophical Theology of Duns Scotus.

Collection of essays

T. Williams (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus.

 

 

CONNECTIONS

Duns Scotus

 

Note: While Duns Scotus was undoubtedly acquainted with the philosophy of Bonaventura, the Augustinian features of Scotus's thought were probably mediated primarily by Henry of Ghent. Positive and negative references to Bonaventura have nevertheless been included below. The influence of Aristotle may be taken to be primarily through Aquinas and the Arabian philosophers.

 

Metaphysics/ natural theology
[1a; cf. 5e]

Metaphysics concerned with being and its modes; reason & faith distinct; reason/ metaphysics limited (sense-experience as basis)

   Avicenna

   Averroes

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

[1a b 5d]

[1a]

[1a]

[1a 1b 6a]

[1a]

[2f 3a c]

 

[1b] Transcendentals; convertible and disjunctive attributes

   Avicenna

   Aquinas

[1a]

[1g]

 

[1c] 'Being' univocal not analogical; signification: formal and mental existence; first and second 'intentions'

   Avicenna

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

Suarez

[1e]

[3a]

[3c]

[1g]

[1b 3b]

[1c]

 

[1d] Subjective mental and linguistic structures as conditioning experience Heidegger [1b]

 

[1e] Intentionality Brentano [1a]

 

[2a; see also 1b 2b c g 3b c 4b] The 'objective formal distinction' Ockham [1e]

 

[2b; cf. 3b c] Essence and existence distinguishable but not separable

   Avicenna

   Averroes

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

Suarez

[1d]

[2a]

[1d]

[1b]

[2b]

[1d 2a b]

 

[2c; cf. 2g 5a d] Individual thing composed of 'haecceitas' (essence) & matter

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

Suarez

Peirce

   Husserl

[1c 2a]

[1b]

[3d 3e]

[2b]

[1d i]

[2d]

 

[2d; cf. 4c] Plurality of forms

   Avicenna

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

   Ockham

[1f]

[4c]

[2c]

[1h]

[5a]

 

[2e]

Hylomorphism (probably) not universal

 

   Avicenna

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

[3e]

[4a]

[2a]

[1h]

[5a]

 

[2f] Matter not mere potentiality

   Avicenna

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

[2a 3e]

[4b]

[2a]

[1c]

 

[2g] Individuation through haecceitas not matter and form; universals in intellect as 'abstracted natures' and distinct from 'thisness' in 'objective formal' sense

   Avicenna

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Suarez

Leibniz

Peirce

[3e]

[4g]

[2b 6e]

[1i]

[2c]

[2b]

[2a]

 

[2h] No seminal reasons

   Augustine

   Aquinas

[4e]

[2c]

 

[3a]

Proofs for God's existence:

 

   
  i ontological proof (qualified)

   Anselm

   Aquinas

Ockham

Leibniz

[1e]

[3d]

[4a]

[5b]

  ii a posteriori proofs but metaphysical ones needed; contingency and perfection; 'accidental' and 'essential' causal chains; God as transcendent necessary, exemplary, final, efficient first cause

   Aristotle

   Avicenna

   Anselm

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

Suarez

[12e]

[1d e]

[1b c]

[3e]

[1j]

[4a]

[1g]

 

[3b] God's infinity and unicity; attributes 'formally' distinct — accessible through reason/ faith

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

Suarez

[3c 7a]

[1j]

[4b f]

[1g]

 

[3c] God's essence and intellect: exemplars/ 'intelligible natures'

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

[2a]

[3b]

[1d]

[4d]

 

[3d] God's intellect subordinate to his will

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

[6c]

[5c]

[1e]

[4g]

 

[3e] World created freely in time — but not provable

   Aristotle

   Avicenna

   Averroes

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

[12e]

[3a]

[2e]

[2c]

[3f]

[1f]

[4c]

 

[3f] Evil and God's providence; man's misuse of freedom

   Avicenna

   Aquinas

[3g]

[4a]

 

Psychology
[4a] Rational soul — not composite substance but substantial form perfects whole man

   Avicenna

   Averroes

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

[4a b]

[3d]

[5a c]

[5a d]

[1h]

[5a]

 

[4b] Activity and passivity not distinct powers of soul; faculties distinct ('objective-formal'); no 'acquired' or separate active intellect

   Aristotle

   Avicenna

   Averroes

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

Ockham

[15d]

[4a c]

[3b e]

[5b d]

[5a 5b]

[5a c 5c]

 

[4c] Immortality of rational soul and body's temporary imperfect corporeal form; no certain demonstration

   Aristotle

   Avicenna

   Averroes

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

[15e]

[4d]

[3e]

[5a 5e]

[5e]

[1h]

[5b]

 

[4d; cf. 3d] Man's intellect subordinate to will

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

[6c]

[5c]

[2d]

[6b]

 

Knowledge
[5a] Primary knowledge of of being; secondary knowledge starts from sense-experience — no innate ideas

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

[6a]

[6a c f]

[2a 2c]

[2b]

 

[5b] No illumination (divine or otherwise) for knowledge

   Augustine

   Avicenna

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

[2a]

[5a b]

[6c]

[6d]

[2b]

[2b]

 

[5c] Intuitive and 'abstractive' knowledge

   Aristotle

Ockham

[16d e]

[2b]

 

[5d] Direct knowledge of individuals (singulars, essences, 1st principles) through sensation and active and passive functions of intellect; intellectual knowledge of universals and relations

   Aristotle

   Avicenna

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

   Henry of Ghent

Ockham

Suarez

Peirce

[16d-e]

[4c 5a 5b]

[6b]

[6d 6e]

[2a]

[2b 2d 3d e]

[3c]

[2a d]

 

[5e] Singular intuition 'confused'; no knowledge of soul or divine essence; error due to 'sin'

   Augustine

   Avicenna

   Aquinas

Ockham

   Descartes

[1e]

[5c]

[6g]

[2e f]

[2b 3i]

 

[5f] Inductive and deductive procedures (the latter gives certainty)    Aristotle [6b]

 

Ethics
[6a] Transcendental and natural goodness    Aquinas [1g]

 

[6b] Morally good action and 'circumstances'; intention; intuition by reason without divine illumination

   Bonaventura

   Aquinas

Ockham

[7c 7c]

[8b]

[6c]

 

[6c] Natural law and objective content, moral obligation; God wills what is good; primary and secondary moral principles; God's dispensation; morally 'indifferent' actions (when lacking some circumstance)

   Augustine

   Aquinas

Ockham

[8c]

[8c]

[4g 6a]