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Compiled by Anthony Harrison-Barbet


WITTGENSTEIN

(1889 — 1951)

 

ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY

1. SYSTEMATIC; 2. 'ORDINARY LANGUAGE'

Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in Vienna the youngest child of a large family. His father, an industrialist, was a Lutheran, but Ludwig was brought up in his mother's Roman Catholicism (though he was to disassociate himself from the Church as an adult). The family home was a centre of musical life (his brother Paul was the famous pianist). He was educated firstly at home and then in Linz before studying mechanical engineering at the Charlottenburg Polytechnic in Berlin. From 1908-11 he carried out research in aeronautics at Manchester University. Having become interested in philosophy he went to Cambridge to study with Russell at Trinity College until the outbreak of the First World War. While serving in the Austrian army he worked on notes which led to the publication of his Tractatus in 1921. From 1920 to 1926 he worked as a primary school teacher in Austria — having decided that there were no more philosophical problems to be solved. But in 1929 he returned to philosophy with renewed energy, and having been awarded the Cambridge doctorate for his Tractatus he accepted a lectureship there in 1930. He remained at Cambridge until 1941 (apart from a year living in a hut in Norway to work on his Philosophical Investigations), by which time he had succeeded Moore as professor. During the World War II he worked as a hospital porter and as a laboratory assistant before returning to Cambridge in 1944. From 1947 to 1949 he lived in isolation in Ireland.

 

PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE/ KNOWLEDGE

[1] In his early work [Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus] — the period of his logical atomism — Wittgenstein supposed language to consist of propositions (Sätze), which are the means whereby assertions about the world are made, or through which thoughts about the world are expressed. [See 3.1 ff.] In its 'projective relation to the world' a proposition is called the 'propositional sign' and is a 'fact'. Wittgenstein says that the elements of a propositional sign correspond to the objects of thoughts. Propositions are made up of complex expressions for which we can substitute descriptions. Ideally such propositions can be analysed, broken down ultimately into elementary propositions consisting of 'simple signs', that is, (logically proper) names. Names stand for simple things in the world — objects. However, he gave no examples of elementary propositions, or of names, or of what things might be simple objects; and he remained agnostic about achieving this. Objects may be related to or connected to other objects. Such possible connections are called states-of-affairs (Sachverhalte) [TLP 2]. If the possible connections are actualized, they are facts in the strict sense (Tatsachen) and are then said to be true (but otherwise false). Propositions, Wittgenstein says, are related to the states-of-affairs in that the propositions are 'pictures' (Bilder — which means also 'images' or 'models') [2.1-2.225] — rather as toy cars can be arranged on a table to illustrate a road accident. There is thus a kind of correspondence or isomorphism between the names and the objects they stand for [a]. Logical constants in elementary propositions ('all', 'some', 'is', 'not', for example) do not, however, belong to pictures and do not denote [4.0312]. Moreover, although Wittgenstein supposed all genuine propositions to represent states-of-affairs in this way, he held that the picturing could be shown only after the analysis of the complex propositions into elementary propositions.

Because propositions picture, Wittgenstein supposed they must have something in common with the states-of-affairs they represent. What a picture has in common with what it pictures he calls the 'logico-pictorial form' [2.161-2.17]. Furthermore, in so far as all propositions are pictures they must have something minimally in common with the reality they all picture: this is the logical form or 'form of reality' [2.18]. The difference that makes a picture different from that which it pictures is the 'representational form' [2.173-4]. Naturally neither the pictorial form nor the form of reality can themselves be pictured. Rather they are preconditions for picturing. Wittgenstein maintains also that logical form, as mirrored in language cannot itself be expressed by means of language [b]. They cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it, that is, logical form; to do so we should have to stand with our propositions outside logic [4.12]. Propositions show the logical form of reality [4.121]. They are also manifestations of thoughts, that is, a thought is a 'psychical' correlate of propositions and is thus itself a logical picture of facts [3 ff.]. While names refer or denote objects, they do not have a sense in themselves but only in the context of propositions [3.1 ff.]. To understand a name is to understand its reference. Propositions, by contrast, have a sense, in that we understand them as being related to the 'world' — as picturing it (this is not strictly 'reference') [4.021]. "To understand a proposition means to know what is the case, if it is true" [4.024]. Wittgenstein thus holds the view that the meaning of a proposition is determined by its truth-conditions [c], that is, the conditions under which it is true. And this sense is made clear to us in so far as we should be able to see the constituent and interrelated names if the propositions were analysed into elementary propositions.

Whether or not analysis of genuine complex propositions into elementary ones is possible in practice, Wittgenstein said the relationship between propositions is truth-functional; and he invented the technique of truth-functional matrices to exhibit the possible relationships [see 5 ff.]. Thus the truth of the conjunction 'p ∙ q' depends on the truth values of the propositional variables 'p' and 'q': 'p ∙ q' is true if and only if both p and q are separately true, and false if either p or q is false. Wittgenstein identified two limiting cases: (1) when a proposition is true for all possible combinations of the elementary propositions; (2) when a proposition is always false for all such combinations. Propositions of the first kind are called tautologies, those of the second contradictories [4.46 ff.] [d]. Both types are not strictly genuine propositions. Tautologies, which include all propositions and truths of logic, express no thoughts and say nothing about the world. Neither do they have meaning, that is, sense (Sinn): but they are not nonsensical, because they have a function, namely, to show us the logical structure of language and thus possibilities in the world. They also possess necessity, in contrast to genuine propositions which are contingent and relate to a world which is 'accidental'. Thus 'Either it is raining or it is not raining' is necessarily true but of itself it gives us no facts; it only sets out the limits of the possible. If contingently it is raining in the world, then the disjunct 'It is not raining' is not actualized. As for mathematical propositions these too, Wittgenstein argued, are 'senseless' but not nonsensical. However, they are not tautologies. He supposed them to be equations which sanction us to substitute one expression for another, and he also regarded them as necessary, in some sense imposed on us. But while they thereby show us something about the world they do not 'picture' it. In his later Philosophische Bermerkungen he adopted a 'constructivist' view [e], arguing that mathematical propositions are 'made' not discovered.

[2] After Wittgenstein returned to philosophy in 1929 he gradually came to criticize and eventually reject totally the doctrines implicit in the Logical Atomism of the Tractatus. In his notebooks [Blue and Brown Books] and especially his posthumously published Philosophical Investigations he attacked the view that words stand for objects or essences in some rigid or invariable sense [PI I, 1; Brown Book, paras 1 & 2]. So how do words 'mean', have significance? Take the word 'game' [PI I, 69 ff; Brown Book secs 1 ff.]. There is no single entity or essence denoted by the word, which is a unique characteristic of all games; and to search for one is futile. In some games a ball is used, in others cards. Most games are competitive, in others players play on their own (or perhaps they compete with themselves?). Rather, we should talk of "family resemblances", an "over-lapping and criss-crossing" of characteristics and relationships. His approach is thus now intrinsically 'holistic': 'meaning' is implicit in these relationships between words and in the ways they are used, not in any kind of referencing or representing function. Furthermore the activity of pointing as the basis of 'ostensive definition' is unreliable [Blue Book, pp 1-2; PI I, 27-35]. What is it we may be supposed to be pointing at — the table, its brown colour, its surface? Likewise, in asking what the 'meaning' of a word is, or the 'real form' of a proposition, or how we understand a language or 'know' something, we are liable to commit the same error of supposing that there is some entity — an object in the world, an essence, or a mental 'process' or 'entity' — named by the word. To use a word is to participate in a 'language game' [for example, PI I, 7, and 21 ff.] [a]. Suppose a builder calls out to his assistant 'slab', 'beam', and the like, while pointing at some object. The assistant responds by fetching the appropriate material. The words have functions in this 'game'. The language game 'played' by the builder and his assistant is of course primitive and simple. So, as against his view in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein now argued that there is a multitude of language games corresponding to different 'forms of life'; there is not just one universal form of language. That is why he rejected his earlier idea of ultimate simples denoted by basic elements in our language. What we regard as ultimate or basic is relative to the language game being played. However, he eschews any attempt to produce a systematic and definitive categorization of language (in terms of, for example, assertions, imperatives, and so on). (Implicit here is a rejection, or at least ignoring of any Fregean 'sense'/ 'force' distinction) [see, for example, PI I, 22-24] [b]. So how does language 'work'? A language, Wittgenstein says, uses rules which are either implicit or explicit. They are to be understood in a wider sense than formal rules of grammar. Such rules guide correct usage of names in a given language game. And in so far as the game is 'public', that is, played by others in a social context, the rules guarantee that I am using words correctly, including those that purport to refer to 'private' experiences (sensations, images, volitions and so on). Indeed, there can be no such thing as a purely private language to refer to such 'private' or 'inner' mental experiences. The correct use of 'psychological' words — referring to sensations, impressions, pains, beliefs, 'meanings', understanding in general — cannot be determined by any kind of introspection process; for there is no method by means of which we can compare our usage with new experiences so as to ascertain that names are being used correctly. Similar considerations apply to the question of whether we can have thoughts without a language [c]. We do not have to 'look within', as it were, but rather need only look at the different situations in which the word 'thinking' is used. We shall then find that it is a mistake to suppose there is a single 'inner' activity called thought which must precede and be 'translated' into our language. As he writes:

One might say 'Thinking is an incorporeal process', however, if one were using this to distinguish the grammar of the word 'I think' from that of, say, the word 'to eat'. Only that makes the difference between the meanings look too slight. (It is like saying: numerals are actual, and numbers are non-actual, objects.) An unsuitable type of expression is a sure means of remaining in a state of confusion. It as it were bars the way out. [PI I, 339].

I come to learn how to use psychological words correctly in the context of a 'public' language-game. For example, it was when I hurt myself as a child that I first learned from others how to use the sentence 'I am in pain'. Indeed, according to Wittgenstein, this can be seen as an aspect of pain behaviour. I do not have to appeal to any private state of being in pain. Moreover, the sentence 'I know I am in pain' makes no sense at all. I can know that others are in pain by observing their behaviour or because they tell me they are. But clearly I do not ask myself whether I am in pain. Already in the 1930s [Lectures] Wittgenstein had distinguished between different usages of 'I'. The pronoun has different functions in 'I have a toothache' and 'I have a bad tooth'. In the latter it can be replaced by 'my body', but in the latter case the 'I' has no reference — it does not denote a possessor or 'Ego' [d]. As for proper names, Wittgenstein now thinks of them as being defined in terms of a loose association with various descriptions — their sense changing accordingly [e]: a name is thus used without a fixed meaning [PI 79]. By the time he had written the Investigations Wittgenstein had also altered his view of the necessity of the propositions of mathematics and logic. These are now seen to be necessary in virtue of the (non-compulsory) acceptance of rules embedded in the relevant language 'game' [f]. It follows that because we set our own standards of consistency we can change the rules if we so wish — provided we are willing to accept the possibly chaotic consequences for our mathematical discourse as a whole.

In his last years Wittgenstein made some important contributions to epistemology. [See On Certainty.] His central thesis is that scepticism, doubting makes sense only in the context of the foundational 'inherited background' which constitutes our 'world-picture' and against which we distinguish between true and false [OC 94, 411] [g]. This picture, articulated in our language-games, includes such propositions as 'I know I have a brain' [4], 'The earth has existed for many years past' [411], and 'I know I am in pain' [504]. This last means nothing; certainly there is no inner state to which one can appeal [356]. Such propositions constitute a total system in which all testing, confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place: "The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life" [105]. Wittgenstein allows that a proposition such as 'This is a chair' has the same epistemological status as '2 x 2 = 4', but again he says it is senseless to talk of knowing them if they are taken out of context and if per contra it is possible to doubt them [455, 651]. The only special status they can be accorded is as being part of the 'background'. We cannot appeal to empirical propositions to prove the existence of the external world [h]. The existence of the earth, he says [209] is part of the whole picture which forms the starting-point of belief for him.

Similar considerations apply to claims to universal doubt (even if hyberbolic). We can make mistakes, but to seek to doubt everything is crazy [for example, 71, 196, 217], and indeed is self-refuting, because to do so we would first have to understand the meaning of the sentences we employ to express our doubt, and "...a language-game is only possible if one trusts something" [509]. Clearly we cannot consistently doubt the language we use [i].

 

METAPHYSICS/ ETHICS

[3] For Wittgenstein in his Tractatus period 'metaphysical' and ethical propositions, and indeed all 'non-scientific' propositions can have no sense. (In his later Philosophische Bermerkungen, he said that "the sense of a question is the mode of its answering" [66-7].) According to him most philosophical problems arise only because we insist on regarding such propositions as factual. Strictly speaking, they are not propositions at all. He says we do not understand the logic of our language [4.003]. As a result we sometimes attempt to transcend the boundaries of language (as when we try to talk about the relation between language and the world). Or we do not recognise that the grammatical form of our propositions often fails to reflect their logical form. The apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one. All philosophy is a 'critique of language' [4.0031]. However, it is not a systematic 'science' [4.111] [a]. Its task is to make our thoughts clear [4.112]. Yet, in its assumptions, stance, and content the Tractatus is in its own way a 'metaphysical' text — perhaps in the way that Kant's first Critique is. Essentially it is about the nature and limits of language and the relationship between thought and the world. Its metaphysics is thus implicit in and coextensive with his logical atomism. What 'traditional' metaphysics is supposedly 'about', however, lies beyond language and the world [5.633]. Moreover, because everything in the world is accidental, there can be no value in it; a thing's value would have to be necessary. Both the subject or 'ego', in relation to which good and evil exist, and the realm of value are said to be 'transcendental'. The subject, Wittgenstein says, is a 'limit' of the world [5.632] [b]. All these things which we can say nothing about may be supposed to exist. We still think about their possibility when we contemplate the world itself as existing and as a limited whole. This Wittgenstein calls 'the mystical' [6.45]. But even to say that such things exist is a nonsensical proposition; and this must be "thrown away" like a ladder once one has climbed to the top [6.54]. If we cannot speak about it, we must be silent.

In his later philosophy the problem has shifted. We are no longer concerned with the world as a limited whole beyond which there is a realm of the unsayable. What we may say now is relative to the language game we are playing. Perhaps there are 'metaphysical', ethical, aesthetic, religious language games, with their own rules and criteria for use. (Arguably implicit here is also the requirement that a clear demarcation be made between the methods of the natural sciences and those appropriate to the social sciences — a view which was developed by 'neo-Wittgensteinian' philosophers.) Wittgenstein in fact talks of different 'forms of life' [PI I, 23]. But what can their purpose be? What can they tell us? To suppose metaphysical or ethical words, for example, are scientific would be to pull them out of their proper context — to misapply the appropriate rules. If we did this we would be moving beyond the 'limits' of the language game [c]. If you want to play your own game, so be it: but what you are doing can be properly understood only from within by the players themselves. They cannot be judged by criteria appropriate to a different game. Thus, although Wittgenstein could not empathize with people who engaged in metaphysical speculation or participated in religious forms of life, it would seem that, as in his Tractatus period, he wished to protect those realms — including perhaps speculative philosophy itself, from the predations of positivistically minded philosophers and scientists. Philosophy in a strict sense, however, has now taken on a role akin to that of therapy. Its function is to prevent us from going astray in our reasonings by bringing us back to the way that language actually used in its 'ordinary', that is, proper and appropriate context [d]. Philosophical puzzles can be solved if we discover how they arose in the first place:

When philosophers use a word — 'knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'I', 'proposition', 'name' — and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself is the word ever actually used in this way in the language which is its original home? — What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. [PI I, 116]

We must, he says gnomically [I, 309], "show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle".

 

CRITICAL SUMMARY

It is generally accepted that Wittgenstein created two philosophies. In the first, which received its definitive expression in the Tractatus, he set out to present logical propositions as a set of necessary tautologies which reveal the structure of language and thereby the world. Propositions have meaning by virtue of their contingent 'picturing' of facts in the world as actualized possible connections or 'states-of-affairs'. Names as constituents of elementary propositions thus stand in an isomorphic relationship to the simple objects in the world which they denote. It is in the context of this thesis that he presented his account of truth-functions.

Most of the objections which can be brought against his logical atomism were later made by Wittgenstein himself. The main problems relate to the following.

(1) Language was conceived as having but one function: to picture the world and thereby communicate facts. However, there are difficulties with the concept of isomorphic picturing. If we say 'The cat is on the mat', are we supposing there are three separate factual elements in the world corresponding to three constituents of the one proposition? Might formulations in different languages entail alternative correspondences? Wittgenstein was also faced with the problem of assessing the status of the propositions of the Tractatus itself. His view that they were 'boundary statements' — neither tautologies nor factual propositions — is questionable; for in his later writings philosophy ceased to be an activity of analysing structures to draw attention to the limits of what can and cannot be said. It becomes instead an empirical study of the many different functions a language may perform. One's attitude to this second philosophical approach must clearly depend on one's standpoint. Those in the logical positivist or empiricist tradition would object to Wittgenstein's criticisms of attempts to assimilate other modes of discourse to the scientific, and to his move away from the view that philosophy should seek to eliminate errors by uncovering the formal logical structures supposedly underlying our 'ordinary' informal discourse. Even the 'systematic' philosophers in the analytic tradition are generally not in sympathy with his informal methods.

(2) Propositions were supposed to have meaning by virtue of their 'picturing'. Against this Wittgenstein now says that rather than looking for 'meanings' we should examine the ways language works and how it is used. Philosophical problems arise because we fail to remain within the boundaries of a particular mode of discourse, as when, for example, we treat sensations as if they were material objects. However, many critics would argue that we need to have some concept of meaning (perhaps intentional or 'in the mind') before we can know how to use language correctly. And they would say that use can relate to private rules which do not require public validation.

(3) Wittgenstein claimed to have found the way to eliminate philosophical mystery and error. His critics would say that in so far as his species of linguistic philosophy "leaves things as they are" it is not very illuminating or progressive. However, he was not opposed to any modification of conceptual structures or to the introduction of novel criteria for usage. His objection was to using terms belonging to a particular mode of discourse as if different criteria were already applicable. Nevertheless it is still a matter for debate as to whether philosophical problems can be so readily eliminated in this way.

We have talked of Wittgenstein's 'two' philosophies. However, it is important to appreciate the continuities as well as the differences between his positions. In both periods he was concerned with the nature and function of language, and with the nature, origin, and elimination of philosophical puzzles. In both periods too he was interested in 'boundaries', though in the Tractatus his concern was with the boundary between language in general and the 'world', whereas in his later work the boundaries lie between different modes of discourse. The possibility of a variety of modes of discourse grounded in different 'forms of life' does of course give rise to critical issues concerning an alleged 'relativism' in his philosophy, which does not allow for any absolute standpoint for judging, or for a 'pragmatism' according to which any mode of discourse may be introduced if deemed to be in some sense 'useful'.

 

READING

Wittgenstein: [of many works] Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921); Lectures (G. E. Moore, 'Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33'); The 'Blue and Brown' Books (1933-4); Philosophische Untersuchungen (1958) (Philosophical Investigations); On Certainty (1949-51).

Studies:

Introductions

A. Grayling, Wittgenstein.

D. Pears, Wittgenstein.

More advanced

M. Addis, Wittgenstein: A Guide for the Perplexed.

D. Bolton, An Approach to Wittgenstein's Philosophy.

R. J. Fogelin, Wittgenstein.

P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion.

A. Kenny, Wittgenstein.

Collections of essays

G. Pitcher (ed.), Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations.

H. D. Sluga and D. Stern (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein.

 

 

CONNECTIONS

Wittgenstein

 

Note: While the influences of Frege and Russell on Wittgenstein's early philosophy are in general not contested, there is still much debate about the degree and respects in which they were exercised. The Connections listed below should therefore be regarded as provisional.

 

Logic and language

[Early views]

[1a; cf. 2a] Propositions make assertions, express thoughts about world; elementary propositions (from complex ones) contain logically proper names which denote simple objects; isomorphic correspondence between propositions and world ('picturing')

   Frege

   Russell

   Carnap

Ryle

Austin

Hampshire

Strawson

Dummett

Putnam

[2c 2i]

[1c 1e i 1g 3b]

[3c 4a]

[2a]

[1d]

[1a]

[1e]

[1b]

[1g]

 

[1b] Form of language not describable in that language

Russell

Carnap

[1b 1h]

[2a]

 

[1c; cf. 2a] Names refer but have sense only in context of propositions; propositions have sense because related to world (but not reference); meaning determined by 'truth-conditions'

   Frege

Russell

Carnap

   Davidson

Dummett

Putnam

[2c h 2e g 2i]

[1c]

[3c]

[1c]

[1f]

[1b]

 

[1d] Relation between propositions truth-functional; tautologies (necessary, analytic) contradictions not nonsensical — part of system

Russell

Carnap

[1a]

[2a]

 

[1e; see also 2f] Mathematical propositions neither nonsensical nor tautological, but 'equations' sanctioning substitutions; later view constructivist

Russell

Carnap

Ayer

[1a]

[2b]

[1a]

 

[Later views]
[2a; cf. 1a c 2c] Words do not denote objects/ essences rigidly; they have significance by virtue of use in 'language game'; 'holistic' view of language; meaning not mental entity

   Augustine

   [representative]

   Berkeley

   Nietzsche

   Frege

   Russell

Schlick

Carnap

   Ryle

Strawson

Dummett

Putnam

Searle

Kripke

 

[1j]

[1a]

[3a]

[2i]

[1c]

[2c]

[3c]

[2a]

[1c]

[1f]

[1a]

[1c]

[1b]

 

[2b] Multitude of language games (from 'forms of life'); anti- systematization view of language (and sense/force distinction)

   Aristotle

   Herder

   Frege

   Russell

Schlick

Carnap

   Merleau-Ponty

Dummett

[3a 18b]

[2b c]

[2k]

[2d e]

[1d]

[2a]

[CSa]

[1a c]

 

[2c; cf. 2a] 'Rules'and correct usage; no private language to refer to 'private' experiences — no access to 'self' through introspection; thought and language

   Frege

   Ryle

   Merleau-Ponty

Ayer

Hampshire

Strawson

Hare

Searle

Kripke

[2f]

[3a-d 4a c]

[5a]

[1f]

[1c 1e]

[2c 2d]

[1b c]

[1b 2a]

[1b]

 

[2d] Psychological words learned in context of 'public' language game; different functions of 'I', 'no ownership' view

   Descartes

   Ryle

   Merleau-Ponty

   Ricoeur

Strawson

[2a]

[4b]

[3f]

[5i]

[2c]

 

[2e] Proper names in terms of some set of descriptions (no fixed meaning)

   Russell

Strawson

Searle

Kripke

[1c]

[1d]

[1d]

[1a c]

 

[2f; cf. 1e] Propositions of maths/ logic necessary in virtue of accepted rules in language game; 'constructivist' conventionalist view

   Vico

   Frege

Russell

Carnap

[1d]

[1a]

[1a]

[2b]

 

[2g] Doubt possible only in context of 'foundational background'

   Popper

Searle

[2b]

[4a]

 

[2h] Talk of knowing senseless except in context of background; empirical propositions do not prove external world

   Moore

[2e f]

 

[2i] Critique of 'universal' doubt; understanding of language presupposed    Descartes [1b]

 

Metaphysics/ ethics

[Early views]

[3a; cf. 1b 3c d] Metaphysical, ethical (and non-scientific) propositions have no sense; philosophical problems because they are regarded as factual; grammatical form may not reflect logical form; philosophy as clarificatory (not a 'science')

   Herder

   Frege

   Dewey

   Russell

Schlick

Carnap

   Ryle

Ayer

Austin

Strawson

Dummett

[2c]

[2a 2b]

[2e]

[1d]

[2a d e]

[1a 1b 1c]

[1a b]

[1e 3a]

[1a]

[1a]

[1a h]

 

[3b; cf. 3c] Traditional metaphysics 'about' what lies 'beyond' language and world (the limit); subject/ ego in realm of value, transcendental; 'silence'

   Kant

   Schopenhauer

   Jaspers

   Merleau-Ponty

Putnam

[2d 4a]

[2a c]

[2a]

[4b 5d]

[1g]

 

[Later views]
[3c; cf. 3a b] What is said is real to language game; maths, ethics, religious language games have own criteria, rules for use; philosophical problems because of wrong contexts, inappropriate rules (limits); [?] implicit demarcation between methods of natural and social sciences

   Aristotle

   Berkeley

   Hamann

   Nietzsche

Schlick

   Russell

   Ortega y Gasset

Carnap

   Hempel

   Merleau-Ponty

Austin

Hampshire

   Davidson

Strawson

Dummett

Putnam

Habermas

Searle

Rorty

[9c]

[1b]

[1f]

[3a]

[1d 2b 2c]

[1d]

[2c]

[2a]

[2a c]

[CSa]

[1a]

[1a c]

[2b]

[2a]

[1a h]

[1g]

[2d]

[4c]

[1a]

 

[3d; cf. 3a] Philosophy as 'therapy' — brings us back to language's actual, 'ordinary' use

   Moore

   Russell

   Ryle

Ayer

Austin

Hampshire

Strawson

Dummett

[1d]

[1d]

[1b]

[1f]

[1a]

[1a]

[2a]

[1a h]